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Traditional Faiths in Ukraine and Missionary Activity 
by Anatoly Kolodniy 
Anatoly Kolodniy, who was one of the organizers of the Ukrainian 
section of the Emory University proselytism study project, is head of 
the Ukrainian Association of Researchers of Religion. He recently 
established the Center for Religious Information and Freedom 
(CERIF)and teaches at Mohyla University in Kyiv. 
 
Religious tradition, traditional religion, traditional church: these concepts 
engage not only denominational theologians in Ukraine, but also activists in the 
democratic movement who strive to capitalize on certain traditional religious entities 
as spiritual foundations for the process of national rebirth. 
Let us begin by defining the phenomenon of tradition itself. Tradition serves 
as one form of socio-cultural transmission, which lends to the preservation of culture 
and its reproduction and development. The functional nature of tradition is evident in 
its socializing of new generations. Tradition guarantees the stabilization of social 
relations and cohesion. 
The following properties characterize tradition: formation of a collective 
character; a high level of constancy; and a codification of the life experience of 
human groups. Tradition consolidates the peoples of a nation. Tradition reproduces 
the thoughts of the past in the actual experience of the present. 
Understanding the role of tradition in religious organizations and movements 
is complex. Some approach the concept of religious tradition from a chronological 
perspective. This approach views as traditional those groups who have been around a 
long time. A strict chronological approach would recognize the tradition of paganism, 
for example. Correspondingly, numerous Christian denominations would necessarily 
qualify as ‘secondary’ traditions. 
However, no one has fixed the number of years or centuries a denomination 
needs to exist to call itself ‘traditional.’ The Baptist movement in Ukraine dates from 
1854. That is almost eight centuries less than Orthodoxy, yet it too is a traditional 
denomination of Ukraine. Ukraine has experienced over a thousand years of Islam, 
yet it would not be considered a ‘traditional’ religion of our people. The fact that 
every religious system is a historical event militates against attempting to understand 
traditions merely as a reflection of chronology or geography. 
Each religious system has sequential stages: a period of youth, when it 
emerged and grew; a period when extant denominations opposed it; a period of 
establishment; and a period of development where it blossoms on territories it did not 
originate. Such was the case with Christianity. Since the day of its birth it experienced 
persecution from Jewish synagogues and from the authorities of the Roman Empire. 
To a certain extent, Orthodoxy was fortunate in Ukraine-Rus in that it was Rus’ 
princes who supported its establishment in the tenth through the twelfth centuries. 
Because Christianity did not provide Ukraine’s ancestors with an understanding of 
contemporary life, the surrounding natural environment, and agriculture, they 
continued to comprehend these phenomena through pagan traditions. Christianity and 
ancient beliefs together coalesced in the consciousness of Ukraine. Ancestral cults 
were preserved, as were belief in house-gnomes, forest-gnomes, and water-gnomes. 
The cult of traditional deities was only reluctantly supplanted by Christian patron 
saints that functioned similarly. This history shaped the traits of Ukrainian religiosity: 
openness, syncretism, and tolerance. The religion of the masses can be termed as 
“popular Christianity.” 
All this encourages us to understand religious tradition from other than a 
chronological approach. Religious tradition evolves as a manifestation of the religious 
elements within an integrated system of a people’s culture. These elements are 
organically inter-twined with the group’s spirituality. They express the given 
spirituality by comparison with that of other peoples. Inasmuch as national culture is 
dynamic, its religious element should also be expected to be in a state of flux and 
changing paradigms. In the Ukrainian heritage, traditional faiths are those whose 
systems of rituals and creeds are a unique product of national culture. Such is the 
Ukrainian Christian rite, which took shape during the first seven centuries of 
Christianity’s growth in Ukraine. It is the common heritage of both Ukrainian 
Orthodoxy and Ukrainian Catholicism (a.k.a. Greek Catholicism, or the Uniate rite). 
This helps us to understand why, during the period of nation-building, the 
Ukrainian state and national-democratic movements have, to an extent, defended the 
confessional space of traditional Ukrainian churches from foreign missionaries. This 
reveals the desire for the rebirth of an entire national culture with each of its 
components intact. Only by adopting a perspective that includes the integrated 
context of religion’s history on Ukrainian soil can one comprehend the current 
religious situation in Ukraine, interdenominational relations, and attitudes towards 
missionary activity. 
 
A Complex Denominational History 
The denominational history of Ukraine is complex. This complexity is 
determined by Ukraine’s location on the border between East and West, at the locus 
of contact between two world religions—Christianity and Islam—and between two 
major Christian Churches: Orthodoxy and Catholicism.  
The religious map of Ukraine has never been mono-confessional. Even in 
ancient Ukraine-Rus, there were local gods who were revered by separate tribes in 
addition to the gods whom the whole eastern Slavic world worshipped. By installing 
Christianity as the State religion in 988, Prince Volodimir further complicated the 
map of religious life. He had hoped that this act should overcome a plurality of 
denominations. For the duration of about three centuries, the lower levels of the 
population (villages especially) remained pagan. But the upper tiers of society rapidly 
Christianized. In time, Ukrainians conducted their own unification of the religious 
world by combining paganism and Christianity into a hybrid belief system. This 
syncretic form of Christianized paganism describes the religion of most Ukrainians 
practically to this day. Ukrainians rarely recognize this when they claim to belong to 
traditional historical Christian denominations. 
Constant partitioning and seizing of territory by hostile neighbor states 
(Russia, Poland, and Turkey) and active missionary activity by the Catholic Church 
and Protestant movements from Europe introduced new changes in the religious 
configuration of Ukraine. Poles brought Catholicism to Ukraine (mostly to the 
western regions of Galicia, Volin, and Podilia), and German colonists brought various 
forms of Protestantism, particularly the Lutheran, Baptist, and Seventh-day Adventist 
creeds, to the southern regions. 
Judaism came from Western Europe when the Jews migrated to Ukraine. The 
Hassidic denomination emerged in Ukraine, where to this day, many Hassidic shrines 
attract pilgrims. Islamic congregations appeared on Ukrainian lands from the days of 
the Tartar conquests. However, Islam found almost no followers among the core of 
the ethnos. Those in Ukraine of this faith are usually emigrants from traditionally 
Islamic countries. 
Crimea has long had a striped religious makeup. Ancient Greeks introduced 
Christianity to the region, and the Tartars added Islam in the 13th century. Native 
Crimeans and the Karaims had their own autonomous sect there. 
The Greek-Catholic Church is the most influential of Ukraine’s national 
churches. Its creation in 1596 is often framed as a consequence of strictly external 
forces, namely, the efforts of the Polish authorities and the Jesuits to Catholicize and 
Policize Ukrainians. However, it was the objective, internal factors that caused the 
union of Catholicism and Orthodoxy to produce the Uniate Church. Among these 
factors were (1) the precarious state of the Orthodox Church in the 16th century, and 
(2) the formation of national churches as an aspect of the cultural-historical process of 
the Renaissance and Reformation Age. In time, the development of 
Greek-Catholicism as the national religion of Ukraine became their guarantee of 
national self-preservation. On the one hand, Greek-Catholicism, blocked the Poles 
from Latinizing Ukrainian Christianity, and on the other hand, it prevented the 
complete Russification of Ukrainians in the palm of Moscow’s Orthodoxy. 
Protestantism could have played a significant role in identifying Ukraine’s 
national heritage, but the Ukrainian movement of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries did not take a reformist course, as it was intent on creating a national 
church. It feared breaking with church tradition and the opinion that Orthodoxy was 
the only possible national institution. Protestant movements that appeared at this time 
in Ukraine, particularly the Socinians, Anti-Trinitarians, and Reformists, quickly lost 
influence. The Adventist, Baptist, and other movements of late Protestantism, 
disseminated in Ukraine in the nineteenth century, did not become national religious 
options for several reasons: (1) the denominational religious rituals, which most 
express ethnic traits, were overly simplified; (2) their ideologues over-emphasized the 
supranational character of Christianity and subordinated national living to the 
religious; and (3) their missionary activities were designed to join representatives of 
various ethnic groups to the faith. Surely for these reasons, not a single Protestant 
denomination acted as an agent of ethnic creation or integration in Ukraine. 
Moreover, the liquidation of Ukrainian Orthodoxy’s original, national attributes by 
the Moscow Patriarchate after its takeover of the Kyivan metropolitan in 1686, 
created fertile soil for the unfolding of the Christian sectarian movement. The 
multiplicity of sects facilitated the national disintegration and spiritual 
disorganization of Ukrainians. The Orthodox faith was deprived of its nation-building 
characteristics, and Ukraine was deprived of its own national church organizations. 
The tolerance of Orthodox Ukrainians towards other religions enabled driven, 
persecuted believers of various faiths to find refuge from neighboring countries, (e.g., 
Russia), in Ukrainian lands. Thus we encounter various strands of Old Believers 
(Orthodoxy’s reactionaries), dukhobory, and molokansy. The 1920s and 1930s 
produced its own peculiar boom of denominational differentiation in Ukraine as well 
as in the entire Soviet Union to which it belonged for 70 years. During this period, the 
Johnites, Fedorivites, True Orthodoxy, Apocalyptics, JehovahIlyinites, pidhorntsy, 
and other groups were offshoots of Orthodoxy. In the first half of this century, a range 
of keno-systematic sects appear in Ukraine, including the following: inokentivtsy (in 
the Odessa region), leontivtsy (Volyn), malovantsy (Kyiv), mitrofanivtsy 
(Kirovohrad), and myrashkivtsy (Polisia). Particular to their faith is the belief in ‘the 
living God,’ whose name is pronounced in the name of the denomination. 
Because the Ukrainian people did not have their own political state since the 
thirteenth century, (a fundamental trait of national consolidation), and its ethnic 
territory was continually partitioned among neighboring colonizing states, no single 
faith became the national religion. Orthodoxy and Greek-Catholicism competed to be 
the sole religious expression of the country, and they both yearn to subordinate all 
believers in Ukraine. But this leads only to inter-denominational conflicts that have 
not ceased to this day. 
Since the time of Ukraine’s state independence (1991), its denominational 
situation has become even more complicated. Traditional Ukrainian churches, such as 
the Greek-Catholic and Autocephalous Orthodox (which later became the Kyiv 
Patriarchate), experienced a revival in their social and religious lives. The national 
rebirth movement spawned movements with a pagan basis, such as Native Faith, 
Native Ukrainian National Faith, Great Fire, and others. They all jockey their claims 
to represent the ‘well-spring of Ukrainian religious spirituality.’ In this context, the 
Orthodox Church’s Moscow Patriarchate, to which the majority of Ukraine’s parishes 
belong and which has a three-century history on its territory, is viewed by 
national-democratic forces as a foreign imposition. It is suspected of intending to 
restore the former Russian empire and of indifference to Ukraine’s national interests. 
Roman Catholicism’s growing inroads into Ukraine, through which has gushed a 
torrent of Polish priests and monks, has also drawn public criticism. It is typical that 
this negativity is voiced not only by the Orthodox, but also by the Greek-Catholics. 
The latter are dissatisfied by the Vatican’s chronic disregard of Ukraine’s national 
needs, going so far as to coordinate its missionary work in Ukraine with the Moscow 
Patriarchy. 
 
No State Church 
The historical sketch above leads us to the following conclusions: 
1) Though the Moscow Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church has a lengthy history of 
operations on Ukrainian soil, it is not a Ukrainian national church. It serves as an 
agent of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) to organize its missionary activity in 
Ukraine. Attempts to establish and fortify its existence in Ukraine constitute an effort 
to return Ukraine to the Russian empire. This is what so provokes the displeasure of 
national democratic forces. This was precisely the cause of the schism in Orthodoxy 
in Ukraine. One must distinguish between traditional Ukrainian churches and 
traditional churches in Ukraine, which describes exactly the Moscow Patriarchate. 
2) The Kyivan Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church, like the Autocephalous Orthodox 
Church, has its own seven-century tradition. This history spans from the days of the 
baptism of Rus-Ukraine by Volodimir to 1686, when the Muscovite Church 
subjugated the Kyivan metropolitan. Attempts to revive the Autocephalous Church in 
the 1930s and 1940s failed. Therefore, the rebirth of Ukrainian Orthodox churches 
today, precisely for reasons of self-establishment, strive to restrict various forms of 
missionary activity, from both the Moscow Church and the Apostolic capital. 
3) Using a name with reference to the native ethnos operating on Ukrainian territory, 
or having a relatively long history in Ukraine does not a national church make. If a 
church ignores the national language in its activity, is subject to a foreign 
headquarters which disregards Ukrainian national interests, or even works against 
Ukrainian sovereignty, it cannot be a Ukrainian national church. This is so even if a 
major portion of its parishioners belongs to the Ukrainian ethnos. Furthermore, a 
national church has its operational center within the borders of its own jurisdiction. 
4) This definition of traditional national religious organizations leaves only the Kyiv 
Patriarchate, the Orthodox Autocephalous, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic, and the 
pagan groups. In our day, however, certain Protestant churches, including the Church 
of Evangelical Christian-Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, and Christians of 
Evangelical Faith, have demonstrated, to some extent, a national orientation. 
The existence of new religious movements in Ukraine is a complex problem. 
But even here there are definite shifts. The Community of Krishna Consciousness has 
begun to conduct their religious services in the Ukrainian language, to use Ukrainian 
melodies, and to translate their sacred books into Ukrainian. Moreover, theologians of 
the Community of Krishna Consciousness seek the roots of their tradition deep in 
Ukraine’s history, back in the times of its Tripiltsi culture. Undertaking various 
charitable programs like “Food for the Sake of Life,” the Community strives to help 
the young Ukrainian state to resolve its difficult social problems. 
Recently, certain churches have sought the status of ‘state church,’ 
proclaiming themselves to be the sole national religious institution. However, the 
concept of national church is not synonymous with the concept of a state church. The 
first is a component in the spiritual-cultural cultivation of a nation, while the second 
is an element of the sociopolitical process. For this, it is not obligatory to have an 
entire history in the context of autonomous-national development or to be one’s own 
system of creeds and rituals. While there may be multiple national churches or 
movements in one country, there is usually only one state church institution in a 
country at any given time. 
As a result of its complex history and religious pluralism, Ukraine cannot and 
does not have a state church. To a certain extent, one can justify and understand the 
claim of the Kyivan Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It truly is a 
national church with a long tradition. Lengthy colonial dependence upon the Russian 
Church has minimized its ability to conduct missionary activity and to defend itself in 
opposition to other religious movements. Thus, a certain level of state support for the 
establishment of this church would seem an entirely normal phenomenon. At the 
same time, silent support from various levels of several state institutions for the 
Orthodox Church’s Moscow Patriarchate clearly contradicts the country’s process of 
gaining sovereignty and evokes the dissatisfaction of the national-democratic forces. 
In his time, the Greek-Catholic Metropolitan Andrey Sheptitsky observed that 
the division of Ukrainians along denominational lines “will lead the nation to total 
ruin, if the representatives of the Ukrainian churches do not find a way to unite.”1 
However, this condemnation of multi-denominationalism is somewhat extreme. By 
itself, the religious factor in Ukraine was never a force for ethnic creation or 
integration. It did play a significant role as an agent of national revival, however. Its 
priority was always an allegiance to the national idea. Because Ukraine is 
multi-denominational, national unity can be achieved only by commitment to the 
principles of tolerance in inter-denominational relations and pluralism in one’s views 
of religion and the world. Christian denominations that wish to aid national rebirth 
should not aspire to monopolize influence in the spiritual life of Ukrainians. Rather, 
for national reasons, they should put off the present differences among them. Only 
convergence upon the level of the national idea as the first priority guarantees that 
denominational differences will be viewed as something transitional or secondary to 
the social and religious processes at work. 
 
Crisis Within Historical Orthodoxy 
Historical Orthodoxy is experiencing an acute crisis in Ukraine today. This 
crisis is expressed not merely by Orthodoxy’s division into four hostile churches but 
also by (1) its considerable loss of influence in the spiritual life of the individual and 
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of the Ukrainian ethnos generally, (2) an absence of a deep and abiding faith among 
most Orthodox members, despite the increase of external and ritualistic 
demonstrations of religiosity, and (3) an absence of moral imperatives in the everyday 
life and religion of the Orthodox believer. 
There have been a number of contributors to this crisis: 
(1) The rigid conservatism of Orthodoxy itself as a Christian denomination. A certain 
fixation with the performance of bare ritual alienates the educated believer who 
wishes to know religion and not just see it symbolized in a worship service. 
(2) Orthodoxy’s lengthy existence as the state church under tsarist Russia, when all 
people were forced to attend the churches, followed by severe restrictions imposed by 
Soviet power which confined a priest to activity only within church walls. This 
engendered indifference among the clergy toward missionary work. This conditioning 
has led to the missionary helplessness of the Orthodox Church relative to other 
Christian church’s missions and to its consequent reliance on the state for protection 
of its so-called ‘canonical space.’ 
3) The Orthodox Church always lived at the expense of the sacrifices that its believers 
could make. Today’s financial crisis and the increasing impoverishment of the 
population have depleted the income to church coffers. Orthodox Churches do not 
have proper funds for training its ministry, publishing literature, periodicals, or access 
to mass media, or for organizing missionary endeavors. 
4) Historical Orthodoxy does not have a tradition of humanitarian work or the value 
for paying individual attention to its believers. In the modern environment of societal 
fragmentation, each person seeks outside comfort, life-sustaining advice, and material 
assistance on his/her own. A definite indifference by the traditional churches to the 
needs and interests of the individual repels people and drives them to other 
denominations, often to those that have been introduced by foreign missionaries. 
Based on the principles of “One Lord, one faith,” (Ephesians 4:5) and “One 
flock and one shepherd,” (John 10:16), Orthodox ideologues in Ukraine today stress 
their role as ‘the true path to salvation.’ They contend that their denomination is not 
merely one of many faiths but assert its exclusivity, as though history itself has 
prepared and approved its exceptional status. Orthodoxy, they note, is “a church made 
unique by its own truth.” When considered merely as one of many faiths, its universal 
power and glory is not so convincing. Therefore, Orthodox theorists attempt not so 
much to contradict other denominations as to discover in them manifestations of 
Orthodoxy’s own universal spirit as a means to ‘Orthodoxize’ them. In their opinions, 
this basis of thought and action can reverse sectarian individuation from Orthodoxy 
and obstruct in a novel way the missionary activity of outside movements. 
In the opinion of these Orthodox theoreticians, the presence of any ‘seeds of 
Orthodoxy’ assures the convergence of the non-Orthodox Christian churches towards 
‘true Christianity.’ In various ways, they propose only their ‘reeducation into 
Orthodoxy.’ They do not raise the issue of organizationally appending or absorbing 
these non-Orthodox religious institutions into some global Orthodox association. This 
is because universal Orthodoxy is a confederation of independent church structures 
and not a church empire with a single head, such as Catholicism, for example. 
One True Church in Orthodox Publications 
Orthodox publications in Ukraine particularly emphasize the refutation of 
those arguments asserted by various denominations in order to ground the legitimacy 
of their existence in the constellation of Christian groups. In God’s plan, they 
underscore, one Church was built, not several. (“I will build my Church”—Matthew 
16:18.) Thus there can be only one true Christian faith, and not one hundred or even 
one thousand of them. According to Orthodox ideologues, this one church, founded 
by Jesus Christ and full of God’s truth, is the Orthodox Church. Other churches, 
because they emerged after this divine act of creation, are human products and thus 
not ‘churches’ at all.2 In a series of brochures, “The Church and churches,” the 
Moscow Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church sets forth this very position, 
that this single church is Orthodoxy. They conclude, then, that the rest of the 
Christian movements—Catholic, Baptist, Adventist, Mormon, Jehovah’s Witness, 
and others—have no right to call themselves ‘churches.’ These publications refer to 
them as “churches” in quotes. 
The Orthodox go so far as to reserve for themselves not only the right to the 
title of ‘church’ but also to the status of ‘religion.’ Proclaiming other faiths 
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pseudo-religious, they ascribe to them immorality, neglect of individual interests, and 
outright criminal behavior. They accuse missionaries of “zombification of their 
‘sacrifices,” of using mental pressure, manipulation of consciousness under the guise 
of performing rites, concealment of the true content of their denomination’s creed, 
and other horrible things. 
It is well known that Orthodox believers traditionally express their devotion 
and religiosity through observing rituals. The ideologues of Orthodoxy seek to avert 
its followers from competing teachings, missions, and neo-religious influences by 
promoting the unsophisticated fixation that these groups lack “a liturgy in the true 
sense of the word,” “the saving power of the rites,” “the recognition of Orthodox 
cathedrals,” etc. In addition, they persistently pursue the point that a church service 
must be performed exclusively in church buildings because only there does it have 
divine presence—not in clubs, halls, or otherwise equipped rooms. The words of 
Jesus Christ, “For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in 
the midst of them,” is interpreted as those who do not have the opportunity to 
exchange a simple meeting of the faithful for the fullness of the Church (Matthew 
18:20). This quote says nothing about such a gathering of believers outside the church 
building qualifying as a church. 
The Orthodox Church publicly claims “a respectful attitude towards 
representatives” of all religions, even pagans, as long as they live conscientiously and 
peacefully. Yet the hierarchy’s councils or its spokespeople define ‘missionary 
activity’ as a means of destroying the people’s morals and national traditions, and as a 
threat to the spiritual health of citizens and to the country’s very existence. The head 
of the Kyivan Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, (UOC-KP), Filaret, 
believes that missionary activity will lead even to changes in the spiritual gene pool in 
Ukraine. Relying on this, he argues that it is essential that the state ban missionary 
activity. “The soul of our people is Orthodoxy,” he emphasizes. “If this soul ceases to 
exist, so too will Ukraine.”3
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In their appeals to Parliament and the President, the leadership of various 
Orthodox churches raises the issue of sealing off access to radio, television, stadiums, 
palaces of culture, and clubs for foreign missionaries. Their current access to these 
media is criticized as the “sale for dollars” of the nation’s sanctity and a depreciation 
of national spiritual treasures. Orthodox churches suspect the charitable work and 
humanitarian aid undertaken by various missions as a means to “trap souls.” We note, 
however, that the Orthodox Churches are not rushing to undertake this work 
themselves. Instead, they cherish the hope that neophytes will convert to Orthodoxy 
simply by acknowledging this faith to be the traditional one. 
Guided by the principle that ‘truth’ is inexorable and imperturbable, and thus 
does not tolerate compromises, Orthodox authors regard missionary activity as ‘false 
witness,’ which excludes the possibility of tolerance towards it. They refute 
arguments that missionaries are engaged in the ‘holy work’ of sharing the Gospel 
among the people by judging that “only the true Church has the exclusive right to 
interpret Biblical texts inasmuch as only the Church has a command of Bible 
language.” 
Orthodox publications represent foreign religious missions as transferring 
Western native competitive struggles of various Christian faiths onto Ukrainian soil. 
They claim that missionaries and preachers bear not the true word of God, but their 
personal interpretation of it. That which Billy Graham professes differs from that 
which Mark Finley or John Carter asserts. Missionary interpretations of the Bible are 
accused of a subtext promoting the ‘American Dream’ and the spirit of selfish gain 
and business, which is far from the ancient Eastern tradition and which is historically 
and spiritually invalid. 
Orthodox publications argue for a definite distancing from missionary 
influences, and warn the reader to “beware, lest others deceive you.” Jesus said there 
would be “many of these” (Matthew 24:4). They point to Biblical passages such as 
“be not carried about with divers and strange doctrines” (Hebrews 13:9) and “be ye 
not unequally yoked together with unbelievers” (2 Corinthians 6:14). 
Orthodox theorists attribute the success of foreign Christian missions to a 
range of factors: (1) an explosion of the sins of humanity given Ukraine’s new social 
conditions, and “where there is sin, there is fertile soil for the devil;” (2) a spiritual 
hunger among people in times of materialism that makes them ready to swallow 
“life-giving juice and deadly poison” together in the form of churches that are bad 
and cannot bring salvation; (3) the fundamental Christian illiteracy of believers which 
makes them susceptible to false witness and even erroneous interpretations of ‘Holy 
Scripture’ by missionaries; (4) a popular ignorance of the real meaning of spirituality 
which allows them to adopt a religion that is “pleasant on the outside, but venomous 
at the core;” (5) a casual attitude towards holy teaching, which, through pride and 
self-assurance, manifest themselves by a disregard for traditional faith. Instead, 
individuals yearn to become wise by reasoning out their own understanding of the 
creeds of various faiths. 
Theorists conclude that is it better to be completely without faith then to 
“subscribe to false reasoning which can deprive one not only of a future life in 
eternity but also current earthly life.” Additionally, they advise that, before choosing 
a faith, one must certainly counsel with an educated Orthodox priest to learn about 
the purpose of the religion of the holy fathers. 
Recent efforts by the state, and even some priests and laity to create more 
favorable conditions for missionary activity, have provoked severe criticism for 
“opening its borders to them.” “If people go to the false prophets,” warns Archbishop 
Ihor Issichenko of the Autocephalous Church, “then that indicates that we did not 
teach them in time, did not quench their spiritual thirst, and did not give them the 
chance to meet the Living God in the holy Temple.” The Moscow Patriarchate takes a 
somewhat different swipe at followers of new religions. Typically, it is a forceful 
blow announcing new religions as incompatible with Christianity. A decision that is 
binding upon members of its Ukrainian Orthodox branch, the Holy Synod of the 
Russian Orthodox Church declared “individuals who accept the teachings of these 
sects and movements or, moreover, facilitate their propagation, have already 
excommunicated themselves from the Orthodox Church.” Guided by this Council’s 
statement “On the Attitude of the ROC towards Intra-Christian Cooperation in Search 
of Unity,” the leadership of the UOC declared the proselytizing activity of foreign 
missionaries to be among believers a form of corruption “of the very idea of 
ecumenical cooperation and complementary testimony.” 
The Orthodox youth movement displays greater aggressiveness towards neo-
religious movements. This aggression has more of a religious-political flavor than a 
religious-missionary one. Young Orthodox leaders attack the state because its laws do 
not halt the ‘unrighteous activity of sects.’ They take offense that neo-religious 
preachers receive facilities such as palaces of culture and clubs to conduct events and 
public sermons, and that their literature gets disseminated, and that these preachers 
receive invitations to lecture in schools, etc. 
To counteract missionary activity, Orthodox priests and hierarchs assert in 
their sermons that “the devil himself” is incarnated in the person of a missionary, in a 
form “adapted to humanity’s contemporary condition and level of spiritual and 
intellectual development.” Coming to humanity in the image of an ‘angel of light,’ 
extraterrestrial teacher, and mentor, the missionary imparts ‘wisdom’ that in the end 
leads “a person to commune with Satan.” Patriarch Filaret compares the belief of a 
person of any faith other than Orthodoxy to atheism. “The devil continues to tempt 
people to separate them from God and from genuine spiritual life,” he claims. 
“Recently it has become unfashionable to contradict God. Therefore, other creeds—-
false, though externally respectable—have inter-twined themselves with true faith in 
God.”4  
Historical Orthodoxy no longer relies on its own resilience to counteract the 
spread throughout the country of other denominations. It strives to secure, above all, 
the support of the state. However, the leadership structure of various Orthodox 
churches, in their appeals to the state, typically ask for protection as though it is not 
for their own benefit. They submit that the spread of other faiths mortally threatens 
the nation’s spiritual heritage, a heritage molded by centuries and dominated by 
Orthodox tradition. Alluding to alleged external indicators, Orthodox ideologues 
often vociferously assert the absolute and exclusive role of their faith for the spiritual 
development of the Ukrainian people. They underscore that Orthodoxy has stood the 
                                                 
4Filaret, Patriarch, Whence Cometh Temptation, The Orthodox Bulletin, 1996, No. 9-10, p. 16. 
test of time and that it will lead to nothing unpleasant or unpredictable. The untested 
and unknown faiths could lead to just such an undesirable result. 
 
The Revisionist History of Ukrainian Orthodoxy 
However, this argument does not take into account the revisionist history of 
Ukrainian Orthodoxy itself. During its autonomous existence within the framework of 
the Constantinople Patriarchate (988-1686), it truly matured as a component of 
national culture. Its specific traits included sophistication, evangelism, openness, 
manners, democracy, and government by council. On the strength of its 
achievements, it became its own Ukrainian Christian rite. It differed qualitatively 
from the Byzantine and Russian rites in its praise of humanity, its elevation of earth to 
heaven, and its high level of aesthetics. 
But with the incorporation of the Kyiv archdiocese into the Moscow 
Patriarchy in 1686, the latter exerted tremendous effort to liquidate all that made 
Orthodoxy in Ukraine a truly national achievement. In time, Orthodoxy in Ukraine 
degenerated into an agent of national dissipation and a means of colonization. The use 
of Church-Slavonic language, (with Russian accent), for church services facilitated 
the displacement of Ukrainian as a common language. It fostered the attitude that 
Ukrainian was a not a valuable or viable language, and unsuited for educated spheres. 
Moreover, the Moscow church sought to deprive Ukrainians from their own 
Christian tradition. It appropriated this tradition—including the Apostle Andrew’s 
mission to Ukraine and the baptism of Ukraine-Rus by Prince Volodimir—as merely 
a component of the greater history of Great Russia and regarded Ukraine as its 
territorial frontier. 
Fulfilling its assignment by the Stalinist regime to oppress national Orthodox 
churches (especially in Ukraine and Estonia), and become faithfully subservient to 
totalitarianism for six decades, the Moscow Patriarchate today strives to be the 
dominant spiritual force in the independent states which emerged from the ruins of 
the Soviet Union. In our time, this church is the single Union-wide organization, 
which, acting legally in these countries, concentrates all its efforts on the regeneration 
of the former USSR in modified form. This purpose drives its missionary activity, 
which is often hardly religious, in Ukraine. 
Therefore, when the UOC-MP so widespread in Ukraine seeks to defend itself 
against foreign missionary activity with its urgent declarations about ‘protecting 
tradition,’ what really is at issue is the defense of tradition formed by Russian 
Orthodoxy. Thus, this tradition is as much an import as the various foreign missions 
that seek to convert Ukrainians today. 
For this reason, when considering the issue of Ukraine’s own religious 
tradition, one should, above all, take into account the following: traditional national 
churches in Ukraine are those which have become inalienable components of the 
culture. Having deep historical roots, these churches, in their worldviews and moral 
institutions and ritual practices, have become enmeshed in the culture of their 
believers. This is why protection of their cultural fields of influence from any 
missionary inroads forms an aspect of national rebirth. Ukrainian Orthodoxy, in 
contrast to Russian, was open and tolerant towards various positive elements in the 
activity of other faiths. Examples include its attitude towards the spread of various 
Protestant movements in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the unimpeded 
settlement of refugees of other faiths from Russia or Poland, especially Old Believers, 
Molokany, and Anti-Trinitarians. When an occasional hierarchy of Ukrainian 
Orthodoxy declares his aversion to foreign missions, this is more the result of training 
by Moscow than of the Ukrainian mentality. 
 
Dealing With Today’s Realities 
Orthodox churches in Ukraine must deal with today’s realities. They must 
learn to live in conditions of freedom and not expect that their tradition or state 
support will rescue them. Their church buildings are open for visits by their members. 
The fact that they do not attract neophytes and that their church services are 
frequently sparsely attended by parishioners should concern Orthodox churches and 
cause them to ask why. 
Today, members and potential followers of Orthodoxy are educated 
individuals. They are no longer drawn by the pomp of ritual or literal interpretations 
of Biblical texts. In church, they want to learn about religion and not merely watch 
the performance of dead rituals. It seems that the church has little to say to the current 
generation. It stands on its orthodoxy and lives in the past. 
The revitalization of religious consciousness and modern religious revival do 
not connote a return to the traditional Christianity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. We 
observe that the rift between traditional Christianity and the contemporary religious 
movement has not narrowed during our present national revival. On the contrary, this 
gap continues to widen. Contemporary religious thought is not leaning towards any 
one Christian church, but instead seeks to create (and perhaps on the basis of 
Christianity) a new religion. This new religion does not lose its specific religious 
traits and, at the same time, strives to harmonize with the worldview that proceeds 
from the entire content of contemporary culture. 
An individual in our time achieves faith in the divine nature of her own being 
which is a created soul that is a part of God. Thus she sees salvation in her own 
hands, in the divine and spiritual properties of her own self. For this kind of believer, 
Jesus Christ stands less as a ‘Savior’ or a mediator with God but foremost as a moral 
paragon on the path to becoming one with Him. We observe that traditional Christian 
churches of Ukraine are unprepared to teach such believers. Foreign religious 
missionaries have capitalized on this unreadiness. 
 
Active Missionary Work of Greek-Catholic and Roman-Catholic Churches 
If Ukraine’s orthodox churches are practically excluded from missionary 
activity, then both the Greek-Catholic and Roman-Catholic Churches are actively 
conducting it. Greek-Catholics have squeezed out the Orthodox from three Galician 
oblasts (Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk) by taking over their churches. These 
buildings belonged to them until the so-called Lviv Church Council in 1946 that 
forcibly incorporated the Greek-Catholic Church into the Moscow Patriarchate. 
Evidence of Greek-Catholic growth includes an increase in the number of 
congregations from 2,643 in 1991 to 3,175 in 1997 and a construction program that 
consists of almost a thousand new churches and chapels. They are renovating those 
church buildings that were utilized for other than religious purposes during the Soviet 
period. 
Simultaneously, Greek-Catholicism claims status not as a regional but as a 
nation-wide church and insists on spiritually ministering to its followers throughout 
Ukraine. It seeks to open parishes in eastern oblasts, especially in the areas densely 
populated by emigrants from Galicia. The church does not consider this as 
‘proselytizing in the East.’ “We would not intrude there if our people were not there,” 
claims Lyubomir Huzar, current de facto head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic 
Church (UGCC).5 The church leadership created and heavily supports the 
Kyiv-Vishhorodsky exarchate that organizationally unites the eastern Greek-Catholic 
parishes. To realize the idea of transferring its center to Kyiv, the church has begun 
construction of a patriarchal cathedral. Members of the monastic order of St. Basil’s 
are conducting catechisms in the cities of eastern Ukraine. 
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In actively pursuing its ‘Eastern policy,’ the Church’s leadership couches this 
work in certain cautious terms to disarm the Orthodox. Typical assurances include: 
“We do not wish to capitalize on Orthodoxy’s temporary weakness.” “It would be 
wrong to create a division from the Catholics.” “There are Catholics, there are 
Greek-Catholics, and there are Orthodox. It should not be so. Christians should not 
live divided.” 
While the nationally oriented Orthodox churches accept the mobilization of 
Greek-Catholicism with some degree of calm, the UOC-MP emphatically expresses 
its dissatisfaction. On the one hand, it continues its policy of non-recognition of 
Greek-Catholicism as an independent Christian faith. On the other hand, it perceives 
its successes as signs of Catholicism’s general expansion eastward onto Orthodoxy’s 
self-proclaimed canonical territory. 
Though performing active missionary work in various regions of the country, 
Greek Catholics manifest their disapproval that, as they write, “Ukraine has become a 
kind of ‘wide-open field’ for numerous false, homegrown prophets and preachers 
from different Western sects and foreign religions. The essence of the latter is 
unacceptable to the spirit of the Ukrainian people.”6 The Greek-Catholic church 
believes that the proselytizing of foreign missions will lead to the ruin of religious 
and cultural life for the still unconsolidated Ukrainian nation. It considers itself, 
together with the Orthodox churches (but not the state, as the latter wants), as 
responsible for investing maximum effort towards securing spiritual protection for all 
citizens of the country. It thinks this alliance should conduct an educational campaign 
among the public about the harm and immorality of the teachings and influences of 
certain sects. With a view to executing such a program, the Church arranged for the 
preparation of a thousand such catechism teachers. 
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The activity of Polish Catholic priest-missionaries and monks that spread the 
Latin rite on Ukrainian soil elicits particular alarm in Greek-Catholic lay 
organizations (whose alarm is silently shared by the official church institutions). They 
exhort the Polish Roman-Catholic hierarchy to “minister among the Ukrainian 
population in the Eastern Byzantine-Ukrainian rite” and to subordinate their 
missionaries “to the jurisdiction of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic 
Church.”7  
In fact, Ukraine in the last decade has indeed become a field of active 
missionary activity for Roman-Catholics, who are usually expatriates from Poland. 
They see the goal of their mission to “evangelize and plant the Church among those 
nations or groups where it has yet to put down roots.” To avoid accusations of 
proselytizing, Roman-Catholics ‘ground’ their right to expand the network of 
Catholic institutions in Ukraine in the assertion that it has not regained its pre-Soviet 
status, in terms of the number of monasteries and churches, for example. This flatly 
ignores the country’s new realities, such as its insignificant quantity of 
Roman-Catholic followers and the revitalization process of its traditional national 
churches. The result is that Catholic monasteries settle citizens of other countries in 
Ukraine and foreign priests perform liturgies in half-empty churches. All this 
provokes open condemnation from Greek-Catholic lay and ecclesiastical 
functionaries. 
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Having become the dominant faith in the Galician region of Ukraine, Greek-
Catholicism has also erected a protective barricade against the penetration of various 
foreign religious missions. The theoretical basis for this barricade is the evaluation of 
Greek-Catholicism as national tradition, to which alone the Ukrainian ethnos owes its 
survival and potential for self-preservation. “A great struggle is underway, sects 
multiply rapidly and stir up trouble among the people, and the people treat lightly 
their traditional religion, their faith, for which our forefathers suffered so much.” 
These words of Bishop Sophran the Wise reflect Greek-Catholicism’s attitude 
towards missionary activity. It is typical that the bishop transfers the blame for the 
spread of this so-called “religious cacophony and anarchy” onto the faithful 
themselves. They are blamed because they do not practice their faith and do not go 
bravely among the people to give “an example of righteous living” and to rebut the 
“false witness of the missionaries.”8 The Greek-Catholic Church explains the youth’s 
devotion to other faiths as a result of the clergy’s incapacity to satisfy the inquiries of 
the young generation, to match its level of education, or to share its understanding of 
‘how to be a Christian.’ 
 
Roman Catholic Mission Policy 
The Apostolic capital9 organizes its missionary policy regarding Ukraine 
according to the Decree’s article concerning this activity as adopted by the Second 
Vatican Council. Pertinent is the statement that “God desires all people to be saved 
and come to a knowledge of the truth,” that “the entire human family join into one 
people of God and come together in the one body of Christ.” Given that two billion 
people allegedly have not as yet heard the Gospel news, the Catholic Church views 
the ‘preaching of the Gospel’ as the principal means to realize God’s appointed 
purpose.10  
In the Decree “On Missionary Activity of the Church,” the leadership of the 
Roman Catholic Church lays out the theological grounds for its missionary 
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dissemination in Ukraine. First, God wishes to invite each person to participate in His 
life and salvation, gathering His dispersed children into one. Second, the Apostles 
themselves exhorted the faithful of Christ’s Church to persist in their task, so that “the 
word of the Lord may have free course, and be glorified” (2 Thessalonians 3:1). 
Considering the diversity of the subjects of its influence, Roman-Catholics 
delineate three forms of missionary activity (1) work among pagans, which envelops 
all non-Christians, (2) work among their own believers, and (3) work among other 
Christians in order to renew their unity. In contrast to traditional churches, the 
Roman-Catholic Church does not suffer from a shortage of priests and material 
resources. The Church calls for peaceful receptivity towards its missionary activity 
“based on a common consciousness of faith in Jesus Christ” and its search for 
complementary efforts and cooperation in the social, technical, and cultural spheres. 
This simply masks the Roman-Catholic Church’s desire to establish itself on 
Ukrainian soil. 
Other evidence for this concealed desire is the Vatican’s mission program, 
entitled Pontifica Commisione per la Russia (“Pro Russia” for short) for the New 
Independent States. That this program treats the independent state of Ukraine as a part 
of the Russian empire deserves attention. Thus the Vatican hopes to ‘harmonize’ its 
activity in Ukraine with the Church of the Moscow Patriarchy. 
The publication of a document in June 1992, entitled “General Principles and 
Practical Norms for Coordination of the Action of the Catholic Church in Russia and 
other Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States,” testifies to a definite 
understanding between the Moscow Patriarchy and the Roman leadership concerning 
their respective spheres of influence and ‘missionary action’ in Ukraine. 
Well-educated Polish missionaries of the Latin rite, disguised as ‘protectors,’ arrive 
today in Ukraine with the objective of organizing various schools and groups 
auxiliary to the churches. Ukrainian children are carted off to summer camps in 
Poland, were they experience a significant influence of catechism. 
The Second Vatican Council’s decree on missionary activity exudes 
magnanimity and good intentions. However, the Catholic Church is not observing all 
of its provisions on the territory of Ukraine. Noting the local Christian churches’ 
deficit of priests and resources, the document acknowledges that the Catholic Church 
should provide them with assistance that would serve their development and ripening 
Christian life. In fact, we see not assistance but exploitation of these difficulties, 
aimed at rooting Catholicism in Ukraine. The document also puts forth the necessity 
of adapting missionary work to the customs of the people and the variable 
circumstances of their lives. Here also the Catholic Church blatantly operates outside 
the course of Ukrainian national tradition. As a group of well-known activists in 
culture and science noted in an open letter to the president of Ukraine,11 the Roman 
Catholic Church pursues a course of Policization with its missionary activity, 
motivated by the Ukraino-phobic position of Polish chauvinists. The Church further 
fails to carry out the Decree’s provision for dialogue with non-Christian religions and 
cultures. Moreover, Catholics do not even have any contacts with Protestant 
denominations. 
The Vatican authors of the macro-policy fail to see developing problems and 
situations in Ukraine. In seeking to resolve—with the Moscow patriarch—the 
problems of Ukrainian religious life, the Apostolic capital disregards the presence of 
nationally oriented Orthodox churches in Ukraine and does not communicate with 
them. The joint condemnation of Ukrainian ‘nationalism’ by the Moscow patriarch 
and the Vatican shows the Vatican’s blind spot to the obvious and undeniable 
imperialism of the Russian Church. The latter, alluding to its declared partnership 
with the Roman-Catholic Church, petitions Pope John Paul II through its Bishop 
Augustine in Lviv to “abolish the Unions of Brest and Uzhorod, which stand as an 
artificial wall between us.”12  
Only the imperial church of Russia, which perceives Ukraine to be an 
appendage of the Russian state, could display similar impudence regarding one of the 
traditional Ukrainian churches—the Greek-Catholic. 
The Catholic Church officially declares its recognition of truth and holiness in 
other religions and its lack of hostility towards them. In contrast to the Orthodox and 
Greek Catholics, it does not hope for state restrictions on the missionary activity of 
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new religious movements. Such restrictions would place weights on its own plans to 
expand and evangelize. Sensing its missionary strength and possessing the proper 
material resources for it, the Church does not fear contact with other Christians and 
cooperates with them in the work of “spreading the Gospel news.” Along with this, it 
cherishes the hope that ecumenical cooperation will, in time, transform into a 
unification of denominations on the basis of Catholicism and will catalyze the “return 
to the original, undivided church.” 
We note, however, that Catholic publications in Ukraine sound warnings to its 
faithful regarding the missionaries of other faiths, which “are not written in the law, 
including God’s laws.” They recall the warning of Jesus Christ about false prophets, 
“which come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves” 
(Matthew 7:15). 
Ukrainian Protestant Attitudes to Missions 
In contrast to the Orthodox, the Greek-Catholic and Roman-Catholic churches 
generally receive positive marks and support for the activities of their foreign 
missions from Ukraine’s traditional Protestant churches, namely the Evangelical 
Christian-Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, and Christians of Evangelical Faith. In 
his addresses at scholarly conferences, one leader of Ukrainian Adventism, M. 
Zhykalyuk, advances the notion that missionary activity is “the right to one’s own 
point of view.” Any restrictions imposed by legislation to protect Orthodoxy would 
demonstrate that Ukraine is not a state governed by laws. The leader of the Ukrainian 
Church of Christians of Evangelic Faith (Pentecostals), M. Melnyk, calls for the state 
to revamp its negative view regarding religious missions, and, at the same time, he 
extends a proposition to all Christian faiths to create a single program of missionary 
activity to evangelize Ukraine. 
With a certain level of support from their foreign headquarters [sic], Ukraine’s 
traditional Protestant churches have rolled out widespread evangelical activity. It 
takes familiar forms: propagation of the Word of God through oral preaching, 
customized printed (materials published and paid for by these churches), radio and 
television throughout Ukraine, and charitable work, such as visiting those who live 
alone or who are in pain or in prison, etc. 
Orthodoxy and Catholicism, on one hand, and Protestantism, on the other, 
have different attitudes towards proselytizing. The latter finds it perfectly legal, but 
the former attach an ostensibly negative connotation to this concept. The former 
strives in every way to restrict the proselytizing by ‘outsiders.’ Yet they themselves 
quietly eye Protestants as a target of their own proselytizing. 
 
Conclusions 
We have elucidated the nature of the attitudes towards religious missionary 
activity of both Ukrainian traditional churches and the churches traditional for 
Ukraine. This discussion leads to the following conclusions: 
(1) By itself, the religious factor in Ukraine has never been decisive in the processes 
of ethnic creation and ethnic development or of national renaissance. The national 
idea always took priority. This convergence on the primacy of the national idea 
causes us to view denominational differences as incapable of playing a crucial or 
retarding role in the society’s development or the nation’s revival. Thus the state 
should control the religious process only to the extent delineated in the pertinent 
international and Ukrainian legal documents. In this way every individual is 
guaranteed denominational independence. This freedom includes not only the right to 
obtain the necessary information about a given faith and the right to accept it as the 
creed of one’s own choosing and worldview, but also the right to spread one’s faith 
irrespective of political borders. 
(2) The traditional absence of creedal fanaticism among Ukrainians guarantees their 
tolerant and, to a certain extent, curious attitude towards new religious movements. 
Hostility towards new religions and the desire to place one’s own denomination under 
the aegis of the state is perpetrated foremost by those circles of Church leadership 
who wish to justify their own missionary inertia or to gain political capital among 
those political forces which stand for national independence. 
(3) Considering that traditional national churches (a) were officially forbidden by the 
state during the years of totalitarian rule, (b) lack material resources that in turn 
hampers the operation and organization of religious life in full measure, and (c) must 
now compete with Western missionary centers, the state should be a catalyst for their 
activity. This facilitation can include tax breaks, assistance with the construction and 
repair of church buildings, aid in their publishing programs, and access to mass 
media. 
(4) National tradition is not merely the repetition of that which has happened before 
but also progress on the basis of the past. It is appropriate not only to revive tradition 
but also to continue it in order to maintain its contemporary nature and applicability 
to life. Ukrainian traditional churches will preserve their viability on the condition 
that they include in their functional context that which is positive from the 
evangelical processes carried out by foreign religious missionary activity. The church 
should view its faithful not merely as the object of its influence during the liturgy, but 
also as the subject of its denomination’s focus, that is, the church is comprised of the 
laity as well as the clergy. 
(5) The fact that foreign missions bring the Word of God to Ukraine at a time when it 
lacks its own such opportunities by its traditional faiths and churches deserves 
mention. Those missionaries who arrive in Ukraine do not always take into account 
the thousand-year Christian tradition on Ukrainian lands. Sharing words of morality 
and goodness with the public, they sometimes fail to consider the national concerns of 
Ukrainians. 
(6) The activity of Christian missionaries of various faiths need not focus on the 
creation of their own organizational structures in Ukraine. This activity would have 
greater impact if entered into the context of the evangelical efforts of traditional faiths 
and aided them in catechism work, and preparation of cadres of missionaries. This 
would facilitate the spiritual consolidation of our society, and contribute to the 
establishment of Ukraine as a sovereign state. 
(7) In organizing missionary activity in Ukraine, foreign religious centers would be 
well advised to keep in mind the national, family, and common traditions of 
Ukrainians and to catalyze the process of national state-building. In this process, the 
language used by missionaries is crucial. A missionary who evangelizes in Russian 
allies himself with those Ukraino-phobic forces which retard in every possible way 
the process of Ukraine’s national state-building and renaissance. 
 
